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I. INTRODUCTION
The current interest in statutory reform of product liability
law' presents a unique opportunity for the Washington Legisla-
ture to make some principled decisions in furtherance of the pol-
icies behind product liability law.2 Uncertainty as to the law,
unpredictability of the outcome of litigation, and perceptions of
inequities in the balancing process" have increased the costs of
insurance, litigation, and products, creating a crisis atmosphere,
pitting manufacturers against consumers in a polarized confron-
tation.5 Manufacturers seek to minimize their exposure to liabil-
ity, reduce the size of judgments, and generally restrict claim-
ants' ability to prevail.6  On the other hand, plaintiffs'
representatives seek to continue the present system which they
perceive as favoring claimants.' The legislature, in deciding the
future direction of product liability law in Washington, must
look beyond these polarized interests to policy considerations for
guidance. The policies underlying product liability law support
legislation defining a single, clear cause of action, applying cor-
1. See, e.g., [19791 7 PROD. SAFwrT & Lmx. REP. (BNA) 608-09 (interview with U.S.
Rep. LaFalce); id. at 635 (business and consumer groups endorse proposal); id. at 588
(Pennsylvania businesses report problems); Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of
Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1978).
2. For a discussion of the policies of risk distribution, consumer protection, and
safety incentive, see the text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
3. NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LLBnxry, I PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE
LEGAL STUDY 19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL STUDY]; UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACT § 101, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,716 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.P.L.A.].
4. LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 19-31; see U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 101.
5. See [1979] 7 PROD. SAFETY & LL4. REP. (BNA) 742-43 (lawyers, consumers,
insurance officials clash at hearing); id. at 905 (consumers, insurance industry clash); The
Products Liability Bill (R.I.P. 1979-But to be Born Again), 33 WASH. ST. B. N-ws, No.
7, at 7 (July 1979).
6. See LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 19-31; The Products Liability Bill (R.I.P.
1979-But to be Born Again), supra note 5, at 7.
7. See LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 19-31; The Products Liability Bill (R.I.P.
1979-But to be Born Again), supra note 5, at 7; Remarks of Ron Bland, President,
Washington State Trial Lawyers Ass'n, before the Washington State Senate Select Com-
mittee on Product Liability (Sept. 8, 1979) (unpublished testimony on file in Senate
Research Center, Olympia, Wash.).
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parative fault principles, and adopting the contribution doctrine;
however, those same policies require retaining the doctrine of
joint and several liability, and rejecting proposals for a statute of
repose.'
This comment examines the major reform proposals in light
of product liability policies, the common law, and fundamental
standards of fairness. It compares the alternatives of continua-
tion under the present system, the model Uniform Product Lia-
bility Act (U.P.L.A.),' and state legislative proposals. Finally,
this comment offers specific recommendations regarding product
liability legislation for Washington State.
II. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT
A brief overview of the historical development of product
liability law helps to focus the issues involved in modern legisla-
tive reform proposals. The common law first addressed modern
product liability issues in 1842 in Winterbottom v. Wright,'0
denying recovery to a passenger in a defective carriage because
he lacked privity of contract with the manufacturer." Judicially
created exceptions slowly eroded the Winterbottom privity
rule12 until 1916 when Judge Cardozo broke the privity barrier
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,'8 holding a manufacturer
liable to the ultimate purchaser on a negligence theory." The
next major development came in 1960 when in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors,"5 under an implied warranty theory, the
court held a manufacturer and intermediate sellers liable to the
ultimate user, who was not even a purchaser.' 6 Because the neg-
ligence and warranty theories inadequately address the inherent
8. A number of important issues are beyond the scope of this comment, including:
insurance law reform, workers compensation reform, rules of evidence, affirmative
defenses, and governmental tort liability limitations.
9. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 101.
10. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
11. Id. This holding, requiring privity of contract, is actually an interpretation of
the case that stood until 1905 when Professor Bohlen discredited it as a misinterpreta-
tion. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 AM. L. REG.,
N.S. 209 (1905).
12. E.g., Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 642 (4th ed. 1971).
13. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14. Id.
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16. Id.
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problems of such cases,17 the California Supreme Court in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,8 in 1963, applied the doc-
trine of strict liability to a product liability case."9 In 1965, the
American Law Institute published section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 0 leading to adoption of strict product
liability by a majority of United States jurisdictions.2 1 Washing-
ton joined the majority in 1969 with Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co. 22
Contemporary reform proposals result in large part from frustra-
tion with judicial efforts to interpret and apply strict product
liability in light of the policies that led the Washington Supreme
Court to adopt it eleven years ago.
17. The difficulty of proving the existence of a duty, required in negligence theory,
proved all but insurmountable to many injured parties. Under warranty theory, the doc-
trine of privity, combined with short limitation periods, stringent notice requirements,
and disclaimer provisions, often precluded recovery by injured parties unless the plaintiff
persuaded a court to stretch the doctrines beyond their prior limits. See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 12, §§ 96-98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments b
& m (1965); Comment, Products Liability in Pennsylvania: Precedents, Problems and
Proposals, 83 DICK. L. REV. 565 (1979).
18. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The Greenman court
essentially adopted Justice Traynor's rationale in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
19. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963). Justice Traynor, in Greenman, held a manufacturer is strictly liable "when
an article he places on the market, knowing it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d
at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
20. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
21. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 98, at 657-58.
22. 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). In Ulmer, the plaintiff was injured when a
defectively installed bolt came loose causing her car to become uncontrollable and crash
into an abutment. The plaintiff could offer no evidence of negligence. Defendant did
present testimony that it had exercised due care. The trial court jury gave a defense
verdict. The Washington Supreme Court reversed after reviewing the development of
product liability law and quoting at length from Prosser and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A. The court, however, specifically limited its holding to manufacturers,
deferring decision as to the liability of retailers and intermediate sellers. Id.
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III. UNDERLYING POLICIES
The major policies underlying strict product liability are:
risk distribution, consumer protection, and safety incentive.2 3
The basis of the risk distribution rationale is that the manufac-
turer is in the best position to control and minimize risks and
should, therefore, bear the burden of the inevitable costs associ-
ated with those risks. Manufacturers have a greater abil-
ity-compared with product users-to pay the costs of product-
related injuries and to spread those costs among all consumers
through price adjustments. As a matter of public policy, courts
allocate liability to manufacturers without regard to issues of
duty, privity, or even fault.24
Similarly, the premise supporting the consumer protection
rationale is that consumers, who often lack the skills and knowl-
edge to avoid or prevent product-related injuries, should receive
full compensation for those injuries. Because few consumers
have the financial ability to absorb the costs of unanticipated
product-related injuries, public policy places the financial bur-
den on the party who placed the defective product on the mar-
ket, again without regard to duty, privity, or fault in the negli-
gence sense.2 5
The closely related safety incentive rationale seeks to place
the burden of paying for harm on the party in the best position
to prevent injury. It presumes that if defective construction,
design, or warning caused an injury, the manufacturer can and
should market safer products. Therefore, to encourage develop-
ment of safer products by making safety improvements the more
economic alternative, public policy places liability for such prod-
uct-related injuries on the manufacturer.2 On the other hand,
this rationale also supports the proposition that the amount of
the manufacturer's liability should be proportionately less where
23. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436,
440-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452
P.2d 729 (1969); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Liability. Is There Really a Difference in
Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 259 (1978); Westra, Restructuring the
Defenses to Strict Products Liability-An Alternative to Comparative Negligence, 19
SANTA CLARA L. REV., 355, 363 (1979); Comment, A California Perspective on Strict
Products Liability, 9 PAc. L.J. 775 (1978). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §§
96-99; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments (1965).
24. See note 23 supra.
25. Id.
26. Id,
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the plaintiff's or a third party's actions are a cause of the
injury."7 These policies of risk distribution, consumer protection,
and safety incentive form the basis of strict product liability law
and provide a standard for evaluating the various proposals for
legislative reform. 8
IV. DEFINING THE CAUSE OF ACTION
The first major area of proposed legislative reform of prod-
uct liability law is the definition of the cause of action. Eleven
years after the Washington Supreme Court adopted strict prod-
uct liability, 9 the court still intermingles elements of negligence
and strict liability doctrines in many product liability cases.30
The problem results from the court's failure to recognize that
product liability cases involve two levels of analysis: first,
whether the product is defective, and second, if the product is
defective whether the manufacturer is liable for harm caused by
the product. The Washington court adopted strict product lia-
bility in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,31 a construction defect case,
and because of the unique character of construction defects, the
court did not have to address the standard of responsibility
applicable to determining whether a defect existed.
The existence of a defect was not at issue in the Ulmer
appeal.32 The only issue was whether the plaintiff had to show
negligence before the defendant manufacturer was liable." Hav-
ing accepted the trial court's factual finding that a defect
existed, the Washington Supreme Court held the manufacturer
strictly liable because "(1) . . . there was a defect, (2) which
existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufac-
turer, (3) which was not contemplated by the user, (4) which
render[ed] the product unreasonably dangerous, and (5) [which]
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury."'1 The Ulmer
court's holding, therefore, was that, given the existence of a
defect, the manufacturer is strictly liable if the plaintiff proves
27. See Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for a Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
Rav. 643, 658-59 (1978); Westra, supra note 23, at 375-81.
28. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, at 62, 714-15; Epstein, supra note 27; Westra, supra
note 23.
29. See Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
30. See text accompanying notes 31-46 infra.
31. 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
32. See id. at 523, 452 P.2d at 730.
33. See id. at 523-33, 452 P.2d at 730-35.
34. Id. at 535, 452 P.2d at 736 (Neill, J., concurring).
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the above five elements.
It was in the context of Seattle-First National Bank v.
Tabert35 a design defect case, that the Washington Supreme
Court first said it was applying strict liability to the question of
whether the design constituted a defect." The court proceeded,
however, to say: "[W]e are dealing with a relative, not an abso-
lute concept. . . . [A] number of factors must be considered.
The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential
harm. . . and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimiz-
ing the risk. . . ." Those factors are remarkably similar to the
traditional negligence factors, namely: the burden of exercising
sufficient care, the probability of harm, and the gravity of the
potential harm.8 The court did not distinguish between the two
necessary levels of analysis in Tabert-defect determination and
liability determination-instead treating it as a single-step anal-
ysis. Liability determination was not before the Tabert court,
although the court's language seems to lead to a contrary conclu-
sion.3 9 The court should have recognized that it was only consid-
ering the standard for determining the existence of a defect in
design, and that the standard it prescribed was ordinary negli-
gence on the part of the designer or manufacturer. Having found
a defect on such grounds, the court then could have applied the
Ulmer test" to find the manufacturer strictly liable. By inter-
mingling the strict liability and negligence doctrines and the two
levels of analysis that it should have treated separately, the
Washington court injected unnecessary confusion into product
liability law governing design defect cases.
35. 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
36. In the court's words, "strict liability does encompass a design defect ... " Id.
at 149, 542 P.2d at 776.
If a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is necessarily defective. The
plaintiff may, but should not be required to prove defectiveness as a separate
matter.
Likewise, unreasonably dangerous implies a higher and different standard
than what we conceive to be the intended thrust of section 402A strict liability.
The emphasis is upon the consumer's reasonable expectation of buying a prod-
uct which is reasonably safe ....
[W]e hold that liability is imposed under section 402A if a product is not
reasonably safe. This means that it must be unsafe to an extent beyond that
which would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer.
Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
37. Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
38. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 31.
39. See 86 Wash. 2d at 149-50, 542 P.2d at 775-76.
40. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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The Washington Supreme Court arrived at the same confus-
ing result in Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., a warning defect
case. The Little court used the language of strict liability42 but
applied the same balancing test as in the Tabert design case. 3
As in Tabert, the issue of liability determination was not before
the Little court.44 Therefore, the court decided only the issue of
defect determination, and it prescribed the same negligence
standard for warning defect cases as for design defect cases.45
In effect, the Washington Supreme Court tries to superim-
pose the language of strict liability on both the issue of defect
determination and on the issue of liability determination. 46 In
practice, however, the court properly applies the strict liability
standard only to liability determination, and the lower negli-
gence standard to defect determination. This intermingling of
doctrines under the guise of uniformity creates problems for all
parties in determining necessary elements of proof47 and availa-
ble defenses.48 Most commentators have concluded that the
uncertainty and confusion arising from the court's use of lan-
guage require comprehensive legislation redefining the product
liability cause of action to promote certainty and the policies of
risk distribution, consumer protection, and safety incentive.'
41. 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979); see Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield
Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978); Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash.
2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); Novak v. Piggly Wiggly Puget Sound Co., 22 Wash. App.
407, 591 P.2d 791 (1979).
42. See 92 Wash. 2d at 121, 594 P.2d at 913-14.
43. See id. at 122-23, 594 P.2d at 914. The Little court used almost the same lan-
guage from Tabert as that quoted at note 36 supra.
44. See id. at 120-26, 594 P.2d at 913-16.
45. In Little, the court admitted it is "difficult to separate the concept of an 'inade-
quate warning' from that of a 'negligent supplier.' If one is proven, the other generally
can be inferred." Id. at 122, 594 P.2d at 914.
46. For a discussion of how courts generally have confused product liability doc-
trines see Gingerich, The Interagency Task Force "Blueprint" for Reforming Product
Liability Tort Law in the United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 286-87 (1978).
See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 835-37
(1973).
47. E.g., a negligence cause of action requires proof of duty, breach, causation, and
damages, W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 30, whereas a § 402A cause of action requires
proof of damages, causation, and existence of a defect at the time of manufacture, but no
proof of duty. Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 535, 452 P.2d 729, 736 (1969)
(Neill, J., concurring); see note 20 supra.
48. For example, contributory negligence is a defense to common law negligence, but
it is not a defense to a § 402A strict liability action. See text accompanying notes 68-74
infra.
49. See, e.g., LEGAL STuDY, supra note 3, at 2: Sherman, Legislative Responses to
Judicial Activism in Strict Liability: Reform or Reaction?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359,
19801
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Proponents of statutory reform advocate either a return to
the negligence standard, 50 or a new, separate, comprehensive
definition of the product liability cause of action. 1 The pro-
posed legislation considered by the Washington Legislature in
1979 defined a product liability action as:
[A]n action brought against the [manufacturer, wholesaler,
distributor, or retailer] of a product by a person seeking to
recover damages ... caused by a defective condition of a prod-
uct, including without limitation:
(a) Any defect in product design;
(b) Any defect in product manufacture, including inspec-
tion and testing;
(c) Any failure to warn regarding the product; or
(d) Any failure to properly instruct in the use of the
product.
A product liability action includes all actions based upon
negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability in tort, and any
other substantive legal theory ....
That proposal would have combined into a single cause of action
the various theories upon which product liability claims cur-
rently rest. However, the 1979 drafts did not address the stan-
dard of responsibility the courts should apply.58 By the propo-
sal's silence, and because courts strictly construe statutes in
derogation of the common law," they probably would apply the
361-71 (1978); Wade, supra note 46, at 850.
50. Sachs, supra note 23. Sachs argues that because a strict liability plaintiff must
prove "either that the defect was the result of the defendant manufacturer's design or
that the defect was present at the time the product left the manufacturer's control," and
causation, and because most of the traditional negligence defenses are available, strict
product liability is virtually the same as traditional negligence. Id. at 263. Sachs points
particularly to the difficulty of proving defect and causation and states, "in the proof of a
product defect lies a task almost equal in difficulty to the proof of a manufacturer's
negligence. Proving product design defect(s) is, for all practical purposes, the equivalent
of proving the manufacturer's negligence in the design of the product." Id. Sachs con-
cludes, "the differences ... are fewer rather than more, less rather than greater, and
more apparent than real." Id. Contra, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
51. Sherman, supra note 49, at 361-71; see U.P.L.A., supra note 3, §§ 102(a) & 104.
52. Engrossed Sen. Bill 2333, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1979).
53. The 1979 Washington proposal simply stated that a product liability action
includes all actions previously based upon negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability,
etc., without expressing what standard of responsibility the courts should apply to this
new cause of action. See Engrossed Sen. Bill 2333, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1979).
54. "No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its
words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law
which it does not fairly express." Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). "The
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existing strict liability standard to the proposed new cause of
action. Because the Washington Supreme Court currently uses
the language of strict liability for defect determination as well as
for liability determination," it could view the 1979 proposal as
an invitation to actually apply strict liability at both levels of
analysis, thus placing a burden of almost absolute liability on
manufacturers. Although such an extension of liability might
increase certainty, it also might increase manufacturers' expo-
sure to liability without advancing any of the policies underlying
product liability law."
The U.P.L.A. contains an alternative definition of the prod-
uct liability cause of action. 7 It includes all the types of defects
listed by the 1979 Washington proposal and adds failure to con-
form to an express warranty." Like the 1979 Washington propo-
sal, the U.P.L.A. creates a single new cause of action, combining
suits currently based upon strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, and other substantive legal theories." Unlike the 1979
act. . . being in derogation of the common law, is to be taken strictly." Brown v. Barry,
3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 365, 367 (1797). "Where the expressions of the act . . . are in general
terms, they are to receive a construction that may be agreeable to the rules of common
law, in cases of a similar nature." Levinz v. Will, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 430, 434 (1789).
"It is a general rule of interpretation to assume that the legislature was aware of the
established common-law rules applicable to the subject matter of the statute when it was
enacted." State ex rel. Madden v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 83 Wash. 2d 219, 222, 517
P.2d 585, 587 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 808 (1974). "ITihe common law must be
allowed to stand unaltered as far as is consistent with the reasonable interpretation of
the new law." In re Estate of Tyler, 140 Wash. 679, 689, 250 P. 456, 460 (1926) (citations
omitted). "We would not be justified in holding that the legislature has intended to over-
rule the holdings of this court and a long settled business policy, unless the intent so to
do is clearly expressed in words or made to appear by necessary inferences to be drawn
therefrom." Allen v. Griffin, 132 Wash. 466, 469, 232 P. 363, 364-65 (1925).
55. See text accompanying notes 31-46 supra.
56. For a discussion of the policies underlying product liability law, see the text
accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
57. U.P.L.A., supra note 3, §§ 102(D) & 104.
58. A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant who proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's harm was proximately
caused because the product was defective.
A product may be proven to be defective if, and only if:
(1) It was unreasonably unsafe in construction (Subsection A);
(2) It was unreasonably unsafe in design (Subsection B);
(3) It was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instruc-
tions were not provided (Subsection C); or
(4) It was unreasonably unsafe because it did not coriform to the product
seller's express warranty (Subsection D).
Id. § 104.
59. "Product liability claim" includes any claim or action brought for harm
caused by the manufacture, production, making, construction, fabrication,
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Washington proposal, the U.P.L.A. applies a strict liability stan-
dard only to liability determination; 0 it applies the lower negli-
gence standard to defect determination."1 This proposed split
standard of responsibility more nearly reflects present Washing-
ton law than does the 1979 proposal,"2 and it more equitably bal-
ances the interests of manufacturers and claimants with little
loss of certainty and predictability.
In seeking to promote the goals of certainty, predictability,
and equity by adopting a single, clear definition of a product
liability cause of action, the Washington Legislature should
incorporate the principles of the U.P.L.A. definition." By apply-
design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instruc-
tions, marketing, packaging, storage, or labeling of the relevant product. It
includes, but is not limited to, any action previously based on: strict liability in
tort; negligence; breach of express or implied warranty; breach of, or failure to,
discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepre-
sentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent; or
under any other substantive legal theory.
Id. § 102(D).
60. See id. § 104 (quoted in note 58 supra).
61. Id. § 104 (quoted in note 58 supra).
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in con-
struction, the trier of fact must find that, when the product left the control of
the manufacturer, the product deviated in some material way from the manu-
facturer's design specifications or performance standards, or from otherwise
identical units of the same product line.
Id. § 104(A).
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design,
the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that
the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the serious-
ness of those harms outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a
product that would have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that
alternative design would have on the usefulness of the product.
Id. § 104(B)(1).
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe because
adequate warnings or instructions were not provided about a danger connected
with the product or its proper use, the trier of fact must find that, at the time
of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's
harm or similar harms and the seriousness of those harms rendered the manu-
facturer's instructions inadequate and that the manufacturer should and could
have provided the instructions or warnings which claimant alleges would have
been adequate.
Id. § 104(C)(1).
62. See text accompanying notes 31-46 supra.
63. The basic principles of the U.P.L.A. are contained in sections 102(D) and 104.
U.P.L.A., supra note 3, §§ 102(D) & 104. Although the principles contained in these
sections of the U.P.L.A. are worthy of incorporation, a close reading reveals excess verbi-
age that may be internally inconsistent. Compare, e.g., the first clause of § 102(D)
(quoted at note 59 supra) with the first two sentences of § 104 (quoted at note 58 supra).
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ing the negligence standard to defect determination, the pro-
posed definition subsumes the state-of-the-art issues4 by making
the actual design or warning a factor for the court to balance
against the burdens of alternative courses of action.15 Thus,
while increasing certainty and predictability by establishing a
single set of rules and by clarifying what each party must prove
to prevail, the U.P.L.A. principles also benefit manufacturers by
formally taking into account the intrinsic nature of each type of
defect for purposes of assigning the standard of responsibility.
Because the U.P.L.A. principles more nearly express the present
state of the law than the words currently used by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court," they would also preserve the underlying
policies of product liability law.6 7 For these reasons, the legisla-
ture should adopt a single comprehensive definition of a product
liability cause of action, incorporating the U.P.L.A. principle of
a split standard of responsibility.
V. COMPARATIVE FAULT
A second area of proposed legislative reform of product lia-
bility law is the application of apportionment principles, often
termed comparative fault. Historically, courts have denied
apportionment in product liability actions, in favor of affirma-
tive defense doctrines that leave each party to take all or noth-
64. Manufacturers want, but courts have denied, recognition of compliance with the
state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture as a complete defense. The initial problem is
defining the term "state-of-the-art." There is great dispute over whether it means the
minimum, average, or maximum standards of that manufacturer, or of the entire indus-
try at the time of manufacture, or whether the standards at the time of trial apply. See 1
L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LLABEmrry § 6.01[1] n.15.1 (1979); 2 L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 16C[3][ii] (1979). In addition, there is little agree-
ment about who will determine which standard to apply in a particular case. Id. Stan-
dards could be set by the manufacturers themselves, the courts, or a new federal bureau-
cracy. Because of these difficulties, because of the amorphous nature of safety standards
among millions of products, and because the probable effect would be greater costs for
all parties, the legislature should not adopt a state-of-the-art defense.
The better application of the state-of-the-art issue is that incorporated in § 104 of
the U.P.L.A. Section 104 would permit the court to consider evidence of whether it was
technically and economically feasible at the time of manufacture to design and produce a
safer product. The court would then weigh the feasibility evidence against the likelihood
and seriousness of harm to determine whether the particular design was unreasonably
unsafe, or whether the product was unreasonably unsafe because of inadequate warnings
or instructions. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 104(B) & (C) (quoted at note 61 supra).
65. U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 104(B).
66. See note 30 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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ing.6s In common law negligence actions, contributory negli-
gence-both ordinary failure to discover or foresee dangers and
unreasonable assumption of the risk-was a complete bar to
recovery. 6' Thus, if a plaintiff's negligence contributed even
slightly to his injury, the plaintiff recovered nothing.7" The
Washington courts have not applied the harsh contributory neg-
ligence defense in product liability cases when the plaintiff's
negligence is of the type involving an ordinary failure to discover
or foresee dangers.71 If the plaintiff's acts constitute such ordi-
nary negligence, the defendant remains liable for all damages
despite proof that the defendant's acts were only partially the
cause of those damages. Washington recently adopted a compar-
ative negligence statute that apportions fault between plaintiffs
and defendants, reducing a plaintiff's recovery in proportion to
his fault.72 The courts, however, have refused to extend the stat-
68. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 65; Epstein, Plaintiff's Conduct in Products
Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 87 (1979); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Man-
ufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REv. 627, 644-63 (1968); Twerski, From
Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts,
60 MARQ. L. REv. 297 (1977).
69. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 12.2 at 197 (1974); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 12, § 68.
70. The doctrine of contributory negligence first appeared in Butterfield v. For-
rester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 65, at
416 n.1. In Butterfield, the court denied the plaintiff recovery when a pole that was
wrongfully protruding into the road knocked him to the ground, because he was riding
his horse too fast and carelessly. The first United States case to apply contributory negli-
gence was Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). W. PROSSER, supra note 12, §
65, at 416 n.1. In Smith, on facts almost identical to those in Butterfield, the court
barred the plaintiff's claim unless he could show he had used ordinary care and caution
in riding his horse. Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) at 624. The Washington Supreme
Court has recognized the defense of contributory negligence since before statehood. See
Tacoma Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. City of Tacoma, 1 Wash. 12, 23 P. 929 (1890); Northern
Pac. R.R. v. Holmes, 3 Wash. Terr. 202, 14 P. 688 (1887). Cf. Meigs & Talbot v. Steam-
ship Northerner, 1 Wash. Terr. 78 (1859) (admiralty case finding contributory negligence
and applying apportionment).
71. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980); Teagle v. Fischer
& Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 157-60, 570 P.2d 438, 443-45 (1977); Berry v. Coleman
Syss. Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment n (1965); Westra, supra note 23, at 355, 365-66; cf. Albrecht v. Groat,
91 Wash. 2d 257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978) (contributory negligence is not a defense to com-
mon carrier strict liability).
72. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages caused by negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to the
party recovering.
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ute to product liability cases involving ordinary contributory
negligence, holding that it applies only where the common law
defense of contributory negligence formerly was available. 7
Because contributory negligence was not a common law defense
to a strict product liability claim, courts have declined to extend
comparative fault principles to product liability cases.7 4
Unlike ordinary contributory negligence, however, the
Washington courts recognize the assumption of the risk defense
in product liability claims.75 The courts have modified this com-
mon law defense by applying comparative fault principles con-
sistent with the comparative negligence statute.76 Thus, the
Washington courts deny apportionment to one type of plaintiff
fault while extending it to another. This judicial inconsistency
is the source of proposals for legislative adoption of ap-
portionment.
One option for the legislature is to take no action regarding
apportionment, allowing the courts to develop common law solu-
tions. Until 1980, that option was particularly viable because the
Washington Supreme Court, in the 1977 case of Teagle v.
Fischer & Porter Co., 77 left open the possibility of judicially
adopting comparative fault principles for product liability
cases. 7 8 A number of states, 9 and several federal courts 0 in
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979).
73. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980); Albrecht v.
Groat, 91 Wash. 2d 257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978); cf. Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89
Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977) (rejecting comparative fault on the facts).
74. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980); Teagle v. Fischer
& Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); Berry v. Coleman Syss. Co., 23
Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979).
75. Berry v. Coleman Syss. Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 630, 596 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1979).
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment n (1965).
76. Berry v. Coleman Syss. Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979). The Berry
court reduced the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his degree of fault. Cf. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.010 (1979) (quoted in note 72 supra).
77. 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977).
78. The Teagle court found that the defendant failed to prove any negligence on the
part of the plaintiff. Id. at 160, 570 P.2d at 444-45. It was a matter of insufficiency of the
evidence as to whether, under the circumstances, it was negligent to not wear safety
glasses. The court, however, stated: "This does not necessarily close the door to our
adoption of the theory that any evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence should
be considered as damage-reducing factors. However, on the facts before us, this case is
not the proper one to raise this issue." Id. at 159, 570 P.2d at 444. Teagle was a unani-
mous decision of the Washington Supreme Court. Cf. Albrecht v. Groat, 91 Wash. 2d
257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978) (Hicks, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority erred in rejecting
comparative fault).
79. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976);
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diversity actions, have judicially applied comparative fault to
product liability claims, and the Washington Supreme Court
might logically have followed. The court, however, closed the
door to applying comparative fault principles to strict product
liability actions in the 1980 case of Seay v. Chrysler Corp.81
After Seay, the only viable way to achieve application of appor-
tionment principles to product liability cases is through
legislation. 2
Most legislative proposals are variations of the proposed
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978);
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc.,
262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d
843 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Powers v.
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974); Schuh v. Fox River
Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279 (1974); Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,
51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967).
Daly is particulary significant because of the prominence of the California Supreme
Court as a leader in product liability law developments. Daly involved a plaintiff who
received fatal injuries when thrown from his car after striking a freeway abutment. Gen-
eral Motors defended on the grounds of contributory negligence because the plaintiff did
not use available safety equipment as instructed. The California Supreme Court reversed
the defense verdict and prospectively adopted comparative fault after thoroughly analyz-
ing the effect of comparative fault on the policies addressed supra at notes 23-28.
80. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying
Miss. law); Rodriquez v. Ripley Indus., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying N.H.
law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961); accord, Pan Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (admiralty law).
In addition, the following states have adopted comparative fault statutes for product
liability cases: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14 § 156
(1980).
81. 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
82. Justice Dolliver's Seay decision recites the traditional arguments against apply-
ing comparative fault principles to strict product liability cases. He cites the theoretical
difficulty of comparing concepts of negligence and strict liability. Id. at 322, 609 P.2d at
1383-84. The decision then purports to adopt the rule of Albrecht v. Groat, 91 Wash. 2d
257, 588 P.2d 229 (1978), which denied apportionment in a common carrier strict liabil-
ity case. 93 Wash. 2d at 322, 609 P.2d at 1384. The heart of the Seay decision, however,
is the statement that "[h]ad the legislature chosen. . . it could have extended [the com-
parative negligence statute] to strict liability. It did not do so." Id. at 323, 609 P.2d at
1384. Thus, the court gives the legislature's failure to reverse the court as the reason it
would not utilize the door previously left open to adopt comparative fault principles.
Seay was a six to three decision with a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Utter, arguing,
as did the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978), that the court should adopt comparative fault
because it would lead "to a more just and equitable result." 93 Wash. 2d at 326, 609 P.2d
at 1386.
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Uniform Comparative Fault Act (U.C.F.A.), 8s which would
require the fact finder to determine the relative degree of fault
of each party, after which the court would apportion damages
accordingly. 4 The U.C.F.A., as incorporated in all versions of
the product liability legislation considered by the 1979 Washing-
ton Legislature, 8 would apply to all tort law, extending far
beyond the product liability field. 8 In affecting such areas as
intentional torts, the sweeping language of the U.C.F.A. raises
83. Sections 1 and 2 of the UNIFORM CoMPARATIVE FAULT AcT [hereinafter cited as
U.C.F.A.] contain the essence of the comparative fault provisions:
Section 1. [Effect on Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory
damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but
does not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the
claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under
applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
Section 2. [Apportionment of Damages]
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action,
including third-party defendants and persons who have been released. . . the
court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer
special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings, indicating:
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if
contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each claim
that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and per-
son who has been released . . . . For this purpose the court may determine
that two or more persons are to be treated as a single party.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall con-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of
the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in
accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction.., and enter judgment
against each party liable on the basis of rules of joint-and-several liability. For
purposes of contribution. . . the court shall determine and state in the judg-
ment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accor-
dance with the respective percentages of fault.
(d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable
share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault,
according to their respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liabil-
ity to the claimant on the judgment.
U.C.F.A., §§ 1 & 2, reprinted in 12 UNIFORM LAWs ANNOTATED (Supp. 1980).
84. Id. See Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Compar-
ative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. Rav. 373 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Engrossed Sen. Bill 2333, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1979).
86. "In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages . I..." Id. § 1.
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policy issues different from, and beyond the scope of, product
liability law. To avoid impacting such unrelated areas of the law,
the legislature should limit application of comparative fault to
product liability cases. The U.P.L.A. does limit its coverage to
product liability cases, 7 although it otherwise follows the
U.C.F.A. formulation. Thus, should the legislature decide to
enact a comparative fault statute, a carefully limited formula-
tion would be superior to a broad U.C.F.A.-type approach.
Opponents of comparative fault argue that it is difficult to
compare a defendant's strict liability with a plaintiff's negli-
gence. 8 Courts and commentators have developed a variety of
theories to respond to the apparent problem. Many simply dis-
miss it as being more illusory than real.90 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in the early case of Dippel v. Sciano,91 charac-
terized strict product liability as negligence per se which brought
it within the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute.92 A sec-
ond theory compares the "social fault" of selling a defective
product or the "legal fault" of a breach of duty to sell defect-
free products with the plaintiff's contributory fault." A third
87. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, §§ 102(D) & 111.
88. Compare U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 111, with U.C.F.A., supra note 69, §§ 1 & 2.
Except that the U.P.L.A. limits coverage to product liability cases and uses the term
"responsibility" instead of "fault," the provisions are virtually identical.
89. Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 322, 609 P.2d 1382, 1383-84 (1980); see
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, ch. 12; Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Com-
parative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. Rav. 431 (1978); Levine, supra note 57, at 654-62;
Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974);
Comment, Another Citadel Has Fallen-This Time the Plaintiff's. California Applies
Comparative Negligence to Strict Products Liability, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 485 (1979).
90. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69.
91. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); see Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal
Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 114-17
(1972).
92. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Dippel has received
extensive criticism for injecting unnecessary confusion into the situation, see, e.g., V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, § 12.6, at 205-06, and for distorting the doctrine of negligence
per se from its fixed standard of conduct to a case-by-case standard, see Fischer, supra
note 89, at 439-42. Fischer argues that negligence per se and strict liability are simply
incompatible. Id.
93. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho
1976); Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & Com.
107 (1976); Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-1975-Foreward: Compara-
tive Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239 (1976). Although it is
not clear, it appears that Professor Schwartz advocates this "fictional fault" theory as
well. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, §§ 12.1-.7.
The "fictional fault" theory is subject to criticism for question begging. Fischer,
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theory focuses on causation and purports to compare the relative
causal contribution of each party to the result.94 A fourth theory
for comparative fault is the "automatic apportionment" advo-
cated by Professor Epstein.98 Epstein proposes a pro rata divi-
sion of the damages among all parties who contributed to the
harm.96 Epstein's proposal is as arbitrary as the all-or-nothing
approach under present law. A defendant could reduce his judg-
ment by half with proof that plaintiff was even one percent con-
tributorily negligent.
A fifth proposed comparative fault theory, involving a sim-
ple reduction in damages, has particular appeal for Washington
state. This theory compares the plaintiff's conduct against an
objective reasonable person standard, determines to what extent
the discrepancy caused the harm, and reduces the total damage
award proportionately. 97 This technique does not compare the
conduct of the plaintiff and defendant; it simply reduces the
plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his own fault.' 8 The defen-
dant remains strictly liable for all damages not attributable to
the plaintiff's conduct. The damage reduction theory is espe-
cially appropriate for Washington because it is consistent with
the existing comparative negligence statute, which also reduces
damages in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence.99 The theory
advances the policy of deterrence underlying comparative negli-
gence by requiring plaintiffs to act reasonably. ' Finally, the
damage reduction approach supports the safety incentive and
risk distribution policies underlying strict product liability
law, '' while maintaining judicial flexibility to fashion specific
supra note 89, at 442-44. Fischer argues that social fault and personal culpability are no
more comparable than strict liability and negligence. Id.
94. See Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47
(Alaska 1976) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
The comparative causation theory is subject to criticism because it is no easier to
compare causation than to compare strict liability and negligence. Fischer, supra note
89, at 444-47. Further, critics state there is no functional relationship between causation
and fault. Id. One party, with very little fault in terms of culpable conduct, could possi-
bly be the primary cause, thus incurring 100% liability whereas fault might not exceed
10%.
95. Epstein, supra note 68, at 107-16.
96. Id. at 110-11.
97. Fischer, supra note 89, at 449-50.
98. Id. at 449.
99. WAsH. Rav. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979) (quoted at note 72 supra).
100. Fischer, supra note 89, at 449.
101. Id. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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implementation procedures. Thus, Washington should enact a
simple damage reduction comparative fault statute for product
liability cases.
Opponents of comparative fault also argue that juries are
incapable of understanding and applying such a scheme. 102 In
fact, juries currently apportion damages on an ad hoc basis
despite any theoretical difficulties.103 Institutionalizing and mak-
ing a deliberate process of apportionment would increase cer-
tainty and predictability because the court and the parties could
evaluate the jury's criteria-a check that is not available in the
present ad hoc system.1 ' The task of apportioning damages
would be no more difficult than many other tasks the law
requires juries to perform, such as valuing a person's reputation
or pain and suffering.1 5 Any error of a few percentage points
would be infinitely better than the present all-or-nothing situa-
tion.106 The legislature, therefore, should not hesitate to entrust
factfinders with responsibility for apportioning damages between
manufacturers and negligent plaintiffs.
Another argument against comparative fault is that it would
dilute the value of the consumer protection rationale behind
strict product liability law."° That argument, however, overlooks
the fact that comparative fault would leave the manufacturer
liable for all harm not attributable to the plaintiff's conduct.10 8
The final argument propounded by opponents of comparative
fault, that it would lead defendant manufacturers to plead con-
tributory fault as boilerplate in every answer,' °0 is similarly
unpersuasive. That argument disregards judicial adeptness at
sorting out frivolous claims and defenses as demonstrated by the
Washington Supreme Court in Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co. 110
The Teagle court rejected the contributory fault defense because
102. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 67, at 433-34.
103. Id.; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, § 12.7, at 208; Levine, supra note 68, at 656.
104. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 67, at 433-34; Levine, supra note 68, at 656-57.
105. Levine, supra note 68, at 656.
106. Id. at 655.
107. See Frishman, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability, 1978
ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 577, 582-83; Comment, Comparative Fault and Strict Products Lia-
bility: Are they Compatible?, 5 PEP.ERDiNE L. Rxv. 501 (1978); Case Comment, Products
Liability-Misconduct By the Plaintiff Will Reduce or Eliminate Damages Recoverable
from a Seller or Manufacturer Under Strict Liability-Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978), 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1558 (1979).
108. See Fischer, supra note 89, at 449-50.
109. See Westra, supra note 23, at 375-90.
110. 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977).
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the facts did not support it; the defendant failed to carry his
burden of proof."1' Thus, none of the arguments against compar-
ative fault are persuasive, and consequently they should not dis-
suade the Washington Legislature from enacting a comparative
fault statute.
In addition to the dearth of effective arguments against
comparative fault, a variety of affirmative reasons support
Washington's adoption of such a statute. The overriding reason,
as stated by the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General
Motors Corp.," 2 is that it would be fair.'1 s It would be more
equitable than the all-or-nothing status of current law, by assur-
ing plaintiffs of full compensation for harm caused by products
without forcing society to bear the costs attributable to plain-
tiffs' negligence." 4 Thus, by advancing the comparative fault
policy that a negligent plaintiff should not receive full compen-
sation from a strictly liable defendant who was only partially at
fault in causing the harm, the comparative fault doctrine fur-
thers the strict product liability policy of equitable risk
distribution." 5
Comparative fault would increase respect for the law
because juries could decide cases on the facts by applying a
rational instruction rather than on the basis of emotion." 6 It
would end the ad hoc balancing that now occurs contrary to jury
instructions and replace it with reasoned deliberation. Similarly,
the application of comparative fault would provide an incentive
for consumers to exercise care for their own safety.1 7 It would
account for the fact that consumers can sometimes best protect
themselves by modifying their own behavior to prevent injury."'
Comparative fault would continue to protect consumers
against product defects, while also protecting manufacturers
from liability that is unwarranted because not attributable to a
111. Id. at 159-60, 570 P.2d at 444-45.
112. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
113. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. See Comment, supra note
89, at 490-93.
114. Fischer, supra note 89, at 431-35; Levine, supra note 68, at 658.
115. Fischer, supra note 89, at 431-35; Levine, supra note 68, at 652-54.
116. Fischer, supra note 89, at 431-35.
117. Westra, supra note 23, at 375-90.
118. "[Iln some cases, imposing liability on the manufacturer is not in the public
interest. Certain types of injuries are better prevented by modifying the behavior of con-
sumers." Id. at 380-81.
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product.11 Comparative fault would only limit the consumer's
compensation to the extent of the plaintiff's fault. The law
should not shift to society through the pricing system that por-
tion of the harm caused by the plaintiff's own acts anyway. 20
Comparative fault would also increase the incentive for manu-
facturers to produce safer products, because their liability expo-
sure would directly reflect the risks inherent in their products.'21
By improving safety they could directly affect their liability
exposure. Thus, by adopting comparative fault, the legislature
would more equitably distribute the costs of product-related
injuries, increase the jury system's accountability, provide an
incentive for consumers to be safety conscious in their use of
products, and preserve the policy favoring consumer protection.
By recommending adoption of comparative fault, this com-
ment does not endorse the unnecessarily complex U.P.L.A. pro-
posal,12 2 which confuses the matter by applying the "fictitious
fault" approach. '2  The drafters could more simply have
directed the courts to reduce the plaintiff's damages proportion-
ately to any amount of the total harm the factfinder identifies as
caused by the plaintiff's conduct. This would be consistent with
the comparative negligence statute already in force, 2 " as well as
judicial formulations in other states.' 25 It would have the added
advantage of leaving the detailed implementation for the courts
to work out as they have successfully done under the compara-
tive negligence statute. Thus, Washington can do better than
the U.P.L.A. by adopting a simple, clear, and concise compara-
tive fault statute. 26
119. See id. at 371.
120. Fischer, supra note 89, at 433.
121. See id.
122. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 111.
123. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979) (quoted at note 72 supra).
125. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978); cf. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (arriving
at the same result by applying the term "comparative causation").
126. Although a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this comment, the legisla-
ture should realize that no comparative fault system can be totally fair and equitable
unless it makes some basic changes in the workers' compensation law. Specifically, it
should modify WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (1979) to permit a defendant manufacturer
to obtain contribution for the employer's allocable share of plaintiff's damages, at least
up to the policy limits. The U.P.L.A. takes a more extreme approach, reducing the man-
ufacturer's liability by the amount of workers' compensation paid, without regard to pro-
portion of fault, and entirely removes the insurer's right of subrogation against the man-
ufacturer. U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 114. This area needs more study in order to reach a
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VI. CONTRIBUTION
A third area of proposed legislative reform of product liabil-
ity law is Washington's common law doctrine denying contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors. Recognition of contribution, the
right of a defendant to judicial assistance in securing a propor-
tionate share of a paid judgment from another party who shared
fault for the injury,127 would provide a more equitable distribu-
tion of injury costs among the responsible parties.128 Contribu-
tion differs from comparative fault in that it addresses only the
distribution between -or among tortfeasors of responsibility for
paying those damages suffered by the injured party,129 whereas
comparative fault is concerned with the allocation of fault
between the plaintiff and the defendants as a group. 130 Although
the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the common law doc-
trine denying contribution in 1978 in Wenatchee Wenoka Grow-
ers Ass'n v. Krack Corp.,'3' the legislature should statutorily
join the majority of American jurisdictions which now permit
contribution,'32 further promoting equitable distribution of risks
solution that will complement comparative fault while taking into account the historical
and political concerns of those who would resist any effort to modify the workers' com-
pensation statute.
127. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50.
128. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 238-39,
588 P.2d 1308, 1314 (1978).
129. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 576
P.2d 388, 389-90 (1978).
130. Id.
131. 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978). The court, while stating, "we neither
hold nor mean to suggest that we will reject further consideration of this matter in an
appropriate case," id. at 854, 576 P.2d at 392, reasoned that because other states have
been inconsistent in their formulations of the doctrine, because the court perceives a
conflict with the no-fault elements of strict liability, and because the parties did not
provide workable answers to a number of practical questions, this was not the right case
for adopting contribution. Id. at 850-54, 576 P.2d at 390-92. "Without viable answers, or
possible solutions, to [these] questions, we would be abandoning a rule that has existed
for over 70 years in favor of an 'unknown' which is rife with unresolved complications."
Id. at 854, 576 P.2d at 392.
132. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50; Survey of Washington Law, 14 GONZ. L. REV.
495, 497 (1979). The following jurisdictions have judicially recognized the doctrine of
contribution among joint tortfeasors: Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151
So. 208 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Underwriters at
Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Goldman v. Mitchell-Flectcher Co.,
292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355
(1950); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). Thirty-
three states have adopted contribution statutes: ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1973);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (repl. vol. 1962); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880
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and costs.
Contribution among tortfeasors would be consistent with
other actions of the Washington Legislature. In effect, the legis-
lature repudiated the common law "clean hands"13 and "deter-
ence" doctrines supporting the no contribution rule when it
adopted the comparative negligence statute.34 By implication,
that statute emphasized the policies of equitable loss distribu-
tion and victim compensation. 3 5 In addition, it demonstrated a
legislative belief that factfinders are capable of apportioning
fault among multiple parties.13 By adopting contribution, the
legislature would advance the policies it has already adopted
and would create conflict only with obsolete common law poli-
cies it has long rejected.
Washington's common law rule denying contribution is
inequitable as among tortfeasors.13 7 Its interaction with the oth-
erwise beneficial doctrine of joint and several liability38 often
causes one tortfeasor who is only partially at fault to bear the
entire burden.13 9 Dean Prosser criticized the rule against contri-
(West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(b) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§
6301-6308 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012
(Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to -17 (1968 & Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2413 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 412.030 (1970); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2103-2104
(West 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (repl. vol. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231B, §§ 1-4 (West 1979); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925a-d (1974); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 17.215-.325
(1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -6 (1978);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 1401-1403 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to -6
(1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1977); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8323-8327 (Purdon 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1956);
S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106
(Supp. 1979); TEx. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2212a, § 2 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-
27-39 to -43 (repl. vol. 1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1966);
WIS. STAT. §§ 113.01-.05 (1974); WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977).
133. For a discussion of the common law clean hands requirement, see Comment,
Contribution and Indemnity: Does the Right Exist Among Joint Torfeasors When One
is Liable On a Theory of Strict Liability?, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 572 (1977).
134. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979) (quoted in note 72 supra).
135. See id; DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash. 2d 357, 358, 418 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1966).
136. Note, 49 WASH. L. REV. 705, 707-08 (1974); see WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010
(1979) (quoted in note 72 supra); cf. text accompanying notes 102-06 supra (discussing
comparative fault).
137. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 849, 576
P.2d 388, 389 (1978); W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50; Comment, Skinner v. Reed-Pren-
tice Division Package Co. Adoption of Contribution in Illinois, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 1015,
1016 (1978).
138. See text accompanying notes 143-54 infra.
139. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50; Comment, supra note 137.
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bution as follows:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which
permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered
onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of
execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer while
the latter goes scot free. 4"
The best remedy for this situation is legislative adoption of a
statute permitting contribution among tortfeasors.
Finally, contribution would have no adverse effect on the
policies underlying product liability law. Once the defendants
make the injured plaintiff whole, an equitable apportionment of
the damages among the various defendants does not defeat
those product liability policies."" Contribution would, in fact,
contribute to a more equitable risk distribution and increase the
incentives on most parties for safety. Thus, the comparative
fault policies, fairness among tortfeasors, and the product liabil-
ity policies support legislative adoption of contribution among
tortfeasors.142
VII. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A fourth major area of proposed reform of product liability
law is joint and several liability, a doctrine integrally involved
with the contribution issue. Joint and several liability, the com-
mon law doctrine holding each of the jointly liable parties indi-
vidually liable for the whole judgment where the harm is indivis-
ible," 3 is well established law in Washington."' It involves the
140. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 307 (citations omitted).
141. Comment, supra note 137, at 1024.
142. Consistent with the comparative negligence statute, WASH. REV. CODE §
4.22.010 (1979), and the comparative fault this comment recommends, Washington
should adopt the variety of contribution that allocates the burden among the tortfeasors
in proportion to their relative fault. See Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity,
and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 (1979).
143. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d
1308 (1978); Fugere v. Pierce, 5 Wash. App. 592, 490 P.2d 132 (1971); Litts v. Pierce
County, 5 Wash. App. 531, 488 P.2d 785 (1971). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note
12, §§ 47-50.
144. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d
1308 (1978); Scott v. Rainbow Ambulance Serv., Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 494, 452 P.2d 220
(1969); Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash. 2d 482, 418 P.2d 741 (1966); Madigan v. Teague, 55
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defendants' liability to the injured party, whereas contribution
involves the relationships between those the court has found lia-
ble.145 The joint and several liability doctrine is commonly mis-
understood as imposing the full burden upon one defendant in
all cases. In fact, where time or space separates the multiple
torts, the burden is upon the plaintiff to segregate the harm and
then proceed against each defendant for only that defendant's
allocable share." 6 Even where the torts are concurrent in time
and space, the plaintiff must show that the harm is not divisible
among the defendants. If the plaintiff does not or cannot segre-
gate the harm, then the defendants have an opportunity to do
SO. 14 7 If the court finds the harm divisible, the doctrine of joint
and several liability does not apply, limiting the plaintiff's recov-
ery from each party to only that party's allocable share of the
total damages. 148 Still, the plaintiff must prove that each defen-
dant was a proximate cause of the harm.'4 ' Thus, joint and sev-
eral liability applies under present law only when none of the
parties can demonstrate to the court a rational basis for allocat-
ing damages among the various defendants.
The 1979 legislative proposals would have abolished joint
and several liability. 50 Supporters of the proposed change argue
that the doctrine unfairly burdens one defendant with the entire
cost of the plaintiff's injury, and that it is unnecessary under a
comparative fault scheme.' 5' By adopting contribution, the legis-
lature would emasculate the first argument, by permitting the
joint defendants to collect proportionate shares from each
other. 15 ' The disproportionate burden argument then no longer
would support abolishing joint and several liability.
The argument that joint and several liability is unnecessary
Wash. 2d 498, 348 P.2d 403 (1960).
145. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 588
P.2d 1308, 1314 (1978).
146. Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash. 2d 482, 485, 418 P.2d 741, 743 (1966).
147. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d.
1308 (1978); Scott v. Rainbow Ambulance Serv., Inc., 75 Wash. 2d 494, 452 P.2d 220
(1969); see Madigan v. Teague, 55 Wash. 2d 498, 348 P.2d 403 (1960); Fugere v. Pierce, 5
Wash. App. 592, 490 P.2d 132 (1971).
148. See note 147 supra.
149. E.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 237,
588 P.2d 1308, 1312 (1978).
150. Engrossed Sen. Bill 2333, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1979).
151. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230,
588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
152. See text accompanying notes 127-42 supra.
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under a comparative fault system raises the policy question of
equitable risk distribution. " Someone must perform the task of
securing contribution from each party at fault; the common law
leaves that task to the defendants to resolve among them-
selves." 4 The advocates of change would shift the collection bur-
den to the injured party, forcing the plaintiff to secure judgment
against each defendant individually for each individual's share
of the judgment. But that collection process could cost the
plaintiff more than the amount ultimately obtained. Defendants
could often completely thwart the plaintiff's recovery by refus-
ing to assist in segregating the damages or by pointing to each
other as the sole cause. An additional consequence of abolishing
joint and several liability would be that the injured party would
have to bear the burden of an insolvent defendant. As a matter
of policy, the common law allocates the collection and insolvency
burdens to the parties at fault; in the interest of fairness, the
legislature should not disturb that allocation. Because the com-
mon law doctrine of joint and several liability works fairly,
because the doctrine of contribution will mitigate the dispropor-
tionate distribution of costs among multiple defendants, and
because policy considerations dictate allocating the collection
burden to defendants at fault, the legislature should leave the
doctrine of joint and several liability to develop through the
common law process.
VIII. STATUTE OF REPOSE
A fifth area of proposed reform of product liability law is
adoption of a statute of repose,1 55 the most coveted item on the
manufacturers' wish list and the most harmful proposal from the
consumers' viewpoint. A statute of repose is a fixed limitation
period running from the date of manufacture or the date of
entry of the product into the market,15 6 whereas a statute of lim-
itations requires the plaintiff to initiate suit within a given
153. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
154. See note 143 supra.
155. See Phillips, supra note 1, for a well-reasoned analysis of the distinctions
between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. This comment's opposition to a
statute of repose does not detract from the fact that the legislature, as a corollary to
adopting a single definition of the product liability cause of action, should also adopt a
single statute of limitations for all such cases. See Sherman, supra note 49.
156. Phillips, supra note 1, at 663-66.
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period after the claim accrues.1 5 7 The impetus for reform in this
area has generally arisen from those occasional situations where
manufacturers have had to litigate cases alleging defects in
products that were many years old at the time of injury.1 8 Man-
ufacturers are concerned that even a successful defense may be
quite expensive, and the possibility of losing may create pres-
sures to settle cases they might win with enough time and
money.1 59 They argue that the law should not permit plaintiffs
to sue on an old product, that no one can make products that
last forever, and that after a product has had time to wear out,
the manufacturer should not be liable.160 Thus, the goal is to
shield manufacturers from claims arising many years after the
product enters the market.""
This interest of manufacturers in statutes of repose stands
in stark contrast to the interests of consumers, and is in discord
with the tradition of the common law.162 The policy behind stat-
utes of limitations is to penalize a plaintiff's failure to pursue his
cause of action within a reasonable time after it accrues and,
thus, to protect the courts and defendants from stale claims.163
157. Id. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16 (1979).
158. Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposals for Legislative
Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 595, 612-13 (1978).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 613.
The U.P.L.A. drafters formulated the rationales for a statute of repose somewhat
differently:
The rationale of such statutes is threefold. First, the fact that a product has
been used safely for a substantial period of time is some indication that it was
not defective at the time of delivery. Second, if a product seller is not aware of
a claim, the passing of time may make it extremely difficult to construct a good
defense because of the obstacle of securing evidence . . . . The third rationale
is that persons ought to be allowed, as a matter of policy, to plan their affairs
with a reasonable degree of certainty. . . . There is always the possibility that
the number of claims for older products will increase.
U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 110, Analysis, at 62,734.
161. Although no reliable data is available, there are indications that such long-tail
claims are not a significant problem. Of the cases surveyed by the Federal Interagency
Task Force on Product Liability, in the machinery category, the second fastest growing
segment, only 11 of 28 cases occurred more than nine years after manufacture. NATIONAL
TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT 11-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. In
the automobile category, the fastest growing segment, approximately half the cases arose
within the first year, approximately 90% within the first four years, and only three of
117 cases arose after more than ten years. Id.
162. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177
(1950).
163. Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and Statutes of Limita-
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Unlike a traditional statute of limitations, which focuses on the
plaintiff's conduct in not asserting his claim in a timely manner,
a statute of repose constitutes a substantive immunity from suit
focusing on the age of the product, which is beyond the plain-
tiff's control.1 64 The effect of a statute of repose would be to sup-
press the merits of the claim behind an arbitrary procedural
barrier. 6
By potentially barring suit even before an injury occurs, 6
and in some cases before the plaintiff's initial contact with the
product,16 7 statutes of repose are unfair to plaintiffs. Such limi-
tations alter the balance of rights in favor of the manufacturer,
denying recovery not because of the merits of the claim or the
plaintiff's conduct, but because the product was beyond a cer-
tain arbitrary age.'68 Such a denial of the right to assert an oth-
erwise valid claim for compensation for injury is patently unfair.
The already difficult requirement that plaintiffs must prove the
product was defective when it left the defendant's control ade-
quately protects the manufacturer from claims based on old
products.169 The manufacturer derives sufficient benefit from the
increased difficulty of the plaintiff's burden of proof as time
passes.17 0
A statute of repose also would be inconsistent with the
underlying policies of product liability law.' 7 1 It would be con-
tions, 11 IND. L. REV. 693, 703 (1978). See generally Developments in the Law, supra
note 162.
164. See Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for
Product Suppliers, 1977 INs. L.J. 535, 541.
165. Id. at 537, 541.
166. Elfin, Products Liability Developments and Tactics, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 315, 326
(1979); Gingerich, supra note 46, at 288; Massery, supra note 164, at 541; Note, supra
note 163, at 694.
167. Massery, supra note 164, at 542; Note, supra note 163, at 694.
168. Massery, supra note 164, at 539; Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation
of Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing Concerns, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 149, 154.
169. Note, supra note 168, at 152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment g (1965).
170. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 335 N.E.2d 275, 373
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1975). One commentator concludes:
[Tlhe victim of a product-related injury sustained ten years after the sale of a
product has the most to lose under [a statute of repose]. In view of data indi-
cating that only four percent of bodily injury claims still have not occurred
eight years after the date of manufacture of the product, it may be appropriate
to question whether the manufacturer's need to cut off stale claims has not
been given undue attention.
Gingerich, supra note 46, at 289.
171. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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trary to the policy of risk distribution in that a repose statute
would leave individual plaintiffs to bear the full burden of prod-
uct-related injuries after an arbitrary point in time.1 72 Similarly,
a statute of repose would be inconsistent with the consumer pro-
tection policy by failing to account for the complexity of our
modern society, a society extremely reliant upon remote manu-
facturers to supply most consumer and industrial products. Gen-
erally, manufacturers are far more able to protect against conse-
quential damages than are injured plaintiffs.17 3 Such date-of-sale
limitations would provide incentives for manufacturers not to
report known defects and instead to remain quiet until the stat-
utory period expired. 174 Thus, "rather than protecting innocent
manufacturers from unwarranted claims, the adoption of [a stat-
ute of repose] may result in shielding clearly culpable defen-
dants from the valid claims of severely injured plaintiffs.' 7 5
Likewise, a statute of repose would be inconsistent with the
safety incentive policy7'7 by removing the need to make products
safer. The manufacturer would not need to strive for durability,
but merely to make products that would last for the statutory
period.17 7 Manufacturers do base design decisions on product
and component life, and when liability is unlimited, economic
motives occasionally compel a decision for longevity.1 8 However,
when manufacturers know they are not liable after a certain
period of time, the incentive to prolong the product's safe life
dissipates.' 7 ' Therefore, because it would disserve the underlying
policies of product liability law, the legislature should not adopt
a statute of repose."10
172. Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 114 R.I. 451, 461, 336 A.2d 555, 561 (1975);
Elfin, supra note 122, at 326.
173. Massery, supra note 164, at 542.
174. See id. at 543.
175. Id. at 544.
176. Elfin, supra note 166, at 326.
177. Massery, supra note 164, at 544.
178. Note, supra note 163, at 714.
179. Id.
180. Some commentators have argued that a statute of repose may violate the con-
stitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. See Massery, supra note 164;
Note, supra note 163, at 717-24. See also Knapp & Lee, Application of Special Statutes
of Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351 (1979).
Under traditional constitutional analysis, however, the courts would probably sustain the
constitutionality of a repose statute. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it."). Nevertheless, because a number of state supreme courts
have found similar statutes applying to the construction industry unconstitutional by
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A statute of respose also would treat different manufactur-
ers disparately. Several factors cause the lives of products to
vary: frequency of use, conditions under which they are used,
adequacy of maintenance, and the characteristics and habits of
the individual user.181 The manufacturer of long-life products
could escape liability during a long period when the product
should function safely, while the manufacturer of less durable
products might have to defend a strict liability action years after
the product's reasonably expected useful safe life had expired. 182
It is therefore apparent that such a limitation period would not
be fair as among manufacturers.
In an effort to overcome the inadequacies of a fixed term
statute of repose, various groups have proposed a useful safe life
approach. 183 These proposals would bar all claims arising after
the product's useful safe life has expired."8 4 The problems with a
useful safe life statute of repose are deciding who will set the
various standards" and deciding how the designated party will
arrive at a decision. 86
Proponents of a useful safe life statute of repose have sug-
gested at least three approaches to the problem of designating a
standard-setter. Manufacturers could set the standards through
disclaimers on product labels, but that would serve as a disin-
centive for improving product life-expectancies.18 7 Manufacturer
disclaimers would be subject to manipulation by establishing
applying a higher standard of review (e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.
2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973), Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230,
510 P.2d 879 (1973), 59 A.L.R.3d 81 (1974), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1974)), the legis-
lature should take the constitutionality issue into consideration.
181. Phillips, supra note 1, at 673.
182. Comment, supra note 17, at 570.
183. See, e.g., U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 110(A). The U.P.L.A. drafters, in their
apparent haste to give every group what it wanted, proposed both a useful safe life stat-
ute of repose, id., and a fixed term statute of repose expressed in terms of a rebuttable
presumption with a number of express exceptions, id. § 110(B). This comment will not
address the confusion, protracted litigation, and possible harm that might result from
that superimposition. The drafters' error, however, does not detract from the value of
the U.P.L.A. useful safe life proposal for comparative purposes.
184. The U.P.L.A. proposal provides: "[A] product seller shall not be subject to lia-
bility to a claimant for harm ... if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the harm was caused after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired." Id.
§ 110(A)(1).
185. Gingerich, supra note 46, at 288; Comment, supra note 17, at 570-74.
186. Gingerich, supra note 46, at 288; Comment, supra note 17, at 570-74.
187. Comment, supra note 17, at 570-74.
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self-servingly short periods. 88 The probable result would be
increased litigation on the reasonableness of the period set,
before reaching the merits of the claim. Another suggestion
would entrust the standard-setting responsibility to an indepen-
dent agency.1" While such an agency might be more neutral, it
would still be susceptible to undue influence by the manufactur-
ers it regulated.190 Such influence could be indirect, such as con-
trolling access to information and influencing the selection of
samples for testing, as well as direct. In addition to the new liti-
gation an agency's standard-setting would generate, this method
inevitably would result in a huge bureaucracy to evaluate and
reevaluate millions of products, with the usual bureaucratic
slowness and meaningless paper shuffling. Finally, the U.P.L.A.
drafters proposed that the courts determine the useful safe life
of each product on a case-by-case basis.' 9 ' Although the
U.P.L.A. proposal presents fewer problems than the other useful
safe life proposals, it would place a heavy burden on the already
overloaded court system. The result would be longer trials and
appeals and additional costs to the parties in legal fees and
experts to litigate the life expectancy issue prior to reaching the
merits of the plaintiff's claim. Rather than averting litigation,
the U.P.L.A. proposal would invite it because the court would
make the useful safe life determination only after the trial was
complete. While the plan might discourage some plaintiff suits
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 573.
191. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 110(A). The U.P.L.A. states that:
[A] product seller shall not be subject to liability to a claimant for harm
under this Act if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the harm was caused after the product's "useful safe life" had expired.
Examples of evidence that is [sic) especially probative in determining
whether a product's useful safe life had expired include:
(a) The amount of wear and tear to which the product has been subject;
(b) The effect of deterioration from natural causes, and from climate and
other conditions under which the product was used or stored;
(c) The normal practices of the user, similar users, and the product seller
with respect to the circumstances, frequency, and purposes of the product's
use, and with respect to repairs, renewals, and replacements;
(d) Any representations, instructions, or warnings made by the product
seller concerning proper maintenance, storage and use of the product or the
expected useful safe life of the product; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third party.
Id. § 110(A)(1).
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because of the additional proof it would make necessary, it
would also increase the pressure on manufacturers to settle
questionable cases to avoid the higher costs of litigation. Thus,
the problem of who would determine the useful safe life of prod-
ucts is insurmountable.
Proponents of a useful safe life statute of repose have failed
to propose a workable methodology for setting the various stan-
dards. The task of wear-dating all products for all situations
could prove very difficult, if not impossible.1 " The issue of
whether to date the final product as a unit or to date each com-
ponent part would be in constant dispute.1 9 The useful safe
lives of identical products vary according to conditions of use,
such as temperature and humidity, and according to the fre-
quency of use.'" Even a standard useful safe life for just one
product could not account for all the variables. The difficulty
becomes even greater for new and recent products without a his-
torical data base upon which to make a judgment.195 Predictions
necessarily would become ad hoc and arbitrary. Every decision
would be an invitation to additional litigation, increasing costs
to all parties, often without reaching the merits of the claim.
Thus, the superficial appeal of a useful safe life statute of repose
dissolves in light of the problems inherent in its application.
A serious policy question concerning adoption of any type of
repose statute is how to deal with the need for exceptions or
tolling provisions.'" Courts and legislatures have long recog-
nized that certain circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control,
such as infancy, insanity, or imprisonment, and certain acts by
the defendant, such as absence from the jurisdiction, should toll
any limitation statute.197 In addition to such obvious exceptions,
a number of others would logically carry over from existing law.
These include continuing duties and subsequently arising duties,
where denial of tolling would encourage manufacturers to delay
warning or repair of defects. Instead, they would have an incen-
192. Comment, supra note 17, at 573.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See U.P.L.A., supra note 3, § 110(B)(2) & Analysis at 62,734; D. NOEL & J.
PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY IN A NUTSHELL 336-37 (1974); Massery, supra note 164;
Phillips, supra note 1.
197. Massery, supra note 164, at 538. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.16.170-.280
(1979).
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tive to wait until the statute had run to escape liability. 19 8
Where the product causes cumulative injuries, such as those
involving drugs and chemicals, and where the injury is not dis-
coverable for many years, fairness demands an exception. 19'
Finally, an exception is necessary to permit claims for contribu-
tion and indemnity.200 A statute of repose would give the state a
choice between two undesirable alternatives. If the legislature
and the courts permitted exceptions, the exceptions either would
swallow the rule, or they would result in random application of
the statute of repose, which would at best be arbitrary.'0 On the
other hand, prohibition of exceptions would freeze common law
development and would cut off many valid claims before plain-
tiffs could assert them.' 02 It seems unreasonably harsh to cut off
a large number of such claims prematurely by operation of a
repose statute in combination with the normal delays in the
judicial system. 03 This need for exceptions is another powerful
argument against adopting a statute of repose.
Even if the legislature were to overcome all the above objec-
tions to a statute of repose, it would have to deal with the fact
that such a statute might not help manufacturers in the manner
intended. It would not necessarily result in lower product liabil-
ity insurance premiums, because few product injuries occur after
the six to ten year period usually suggested. °4 Indeed, the best
information available indicates that less than three percent of all
product liability claims result from products more than six years
old.2 0 5 Therefore, the public relations cost of cutting off an occa-
sional meritorious but late-developing claim may well exceed the
value to manufacturers of the certainty of not having to defend
198. Phillips, supra note 1, at 666-67.
199. Id. at 667-69.
200. Id. at 670-71.
201. Id. at 672.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. FINAL REPORT, supra note 161, at VII-20 to -21; Gingerich, supra note 46, at
287; Massery, supra note 164, at 545.
205. "[Pjroducts liability insurance claims are rarely based on older products. Only
1.8% of the property damage claims and 2.6% of the bodily injury claims studied were
based on products sold more than six years before the injury occurred." Note, supra note
168, at 151 (citing INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY:
A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS (1977)). The study examined claims filed with
23 major United States product liability insurers between July 1, 1976 and March 15,
1977. Id. at 151 n.17. The study is important because the insurance industry initiated it
and the industry's ratemaking agency conducted it. Massery, supra note 164, at 542 n.40.
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those occasional claims.
Thus, the reasons for rejecting a proposed statute of repose
outweigh the arguments supporting such a statute. It would be
inconsistent with the policies behind limitation statutes, it
would seek to further protect product sellers who already have
adequate protection, and it would unfairly burden injured plain-
tiffs. A repose statute would violate all of the underlying policies
of product liability law. The alternative useful safe life proposal
is unworkable. Under any formulation the problem of accommo-
dating exceptions and tolling provisions would prove insur-
mountable. Even if someone could resolve these problems, there
is no evidence a statute of repose would accomplish its objec-
tives. For these reasons, the Washington Legislature should not
adopt a product liability statute of repose.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, careful consideration of the proposals for leg-
islative reform, in light of the important product liability poli-
cies,2 ~ suggests the legislature should adopt a single, clear defi-
nition of the product liability cause of action, a comparative
fault statute, and the doctrine of contribution among joint
tortfeasors. On the other hand, these same policies require
retaining the doctrine of joint and several liability and rejecting
proposals for a statute of repose. Clearly, the Washington State
Legislature faces a difficult and complex task in dealing with the
polarized interest groups. However, the legislature can rise above
the fray by adopting three simple and direct measures to correct
the real problems with the common law of product liability
while preserving the remainder of that common law and the pol-
icies it implements. By keeping in mind the underlying policies
of risk distribution, consumer protection, and safety incentive,
the legislature can further those policies while addressing the
problems of uncertainty, lack of predictability, and inequities in
the balancing process.
Howard E. Bundy
206. See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
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